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About the Institute for Societal Leadership 
The  Institute for Societal Leadership (ISL) was established by Singapore Manage-
ment University (SMU) in 2014. ISL aims to tangibly improve the lives of Southeast 
Asia’s citizens by acting as a focal point for cross-sector collaboration between 
current leaders from government, business, civil society, academia and the media. 
The Institute also conducts research concerning social issues in Southeast Asia and 
designs its own suite of leadership training programmes, each of which seeks to 
foster the development of a new generation of Asian leaders dedicated to serving 
society.  
About the Malaysia Labs 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Kuala Lumpur 1-2 October and 10-
11 November. This report was first published on 30 January 2015. 
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I. Acronyms 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BN Barisan Nasional
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISL Institute for Societal Leadership
MaGIC Malaysian Global Innovation and Creative Centre
NEM Gross Domestic Product
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
PAP Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
PETRONAS Petroliam Nasional Berhad
PR Pakatan Pakyat
SIO Social Impact Organisation
SMU Singapore Management University
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf
UNMO United Malays National Organisation
USD United States Dollar
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Kuala Lumpur between 1-2 Octo-
ber and 10-11 November. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
IV. Malaysia 
A. Historical Background 
Malaysia’s story is one of pluralism. Like many 
nations in Southeast Asia, its borders are not 
drawn along ethnic lines. Immigration and the 
influence from colonial European powers were 
particularly prominent in Malaysia because of its 
many important ports. Thus, many aspects of the 
country – its economy, its people – are very differ-
ent on the coasts than they are in the interior of 
the country, a distinction which generally mirrors 
the divide between urban and rural areas as well. 
The geographical territory of modern-day 
Malaysia was traditionally part of the larger Malay 
world connected through their similar Austrone-
sian languages. At its height, the rule of the king-
dom of Sriwijaya  (650-1377) extended over all of 
Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and western Java. 
Sea travel constituted most of the movement in 
the region and the Straits of Malacca was an im-
portant route for the movement of goods and the 
spread of religion, especially Buddhism and later 
Islam. However, maritime trade hubs were intrin-
sically exposed to foreign piracy and raids. As the 
power of Sriwijaya continued to weaken, more 
Malay ethnic sultanates emerged which ruled 
over variously sized territories along the coast of 
the Malay Peninsula, northern Borneo and Eastern 
Sumatra, whereas non-Malays inhabited the land-
locked regions in small agrarian communities. 
These sultanates were decentralised and their 
economic ties and alliances of the Malay sultans 
were divided between rulers in Thailand and sul-
tanates of Indonesia. 
Early colonial presence was limited to Portuguese, 
and later Dutch, control of Malacca beginning in 
the early sixteenth century. A century and a half 
later, the British established the Straits Settle-
ments in Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and 
Malacca (1830), where they ousted the Dutch. The 
populations in these settlements grew as a result 
of Chinese and Indian immigrants and they re-
main where the majority of these minority popula-
tions still reside. The British political control of the 
entire Malay Peninsula followed as trade routes 
expanded inland while they simultaneously felt it 
was strategic to have control in North Borneo, 
formerly controlled by the Brunei sultanate. British 
influence over previously unconnected territories 
resulted in the geographic boundaries of the con-
temporary Malaysian state.  
Japan’s unexpected capture and occupation of 
Singapore (1941-1945) eradicated many of the 
advantages of the British presence resulting in 
local backlash and the sultans’ ratification of the 
Malayan Union. This political unification of the 
nine Malay states and the three Straits Settlements 
gave citizenship to all native-born colonials, re-
gardless of ethnicity. Universal enfranchisement 
weakened Malay-ethnic political power and re-
sulted in the creation of the United Malays Na-
tional Organisation (UMNO), led by Dato Onn bin 
Jaafar. However, the momentum towards inde-
pendence accelerated when UMNO, Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan India 
Congress (MIC) formed the Alliance Party in 1954 
and their leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman (UMNO), 
was elected president in 1955. This alliance finally 
gave “Malaysians” the critical mass they needed 
to strong-arm the British and Malaya was formally 
granted independence on 31 August 1957. Tunku 
and his counterpart in the MCA, Tan Cheng Lok, 
agreed to write the ‘Malay privilege’ – which de-
creed that a portion of civil service positions and 
educational scholarships were to be reserved for 
Malays – into the new constitution. They also es-
tablished Islam as the state religion but protected 
the freedom to practice other religions. In 1963, 
the Federation grew to include Sabah and 
Sarawak (North Borneo), and Singapore. The rival-
ry of Chinese-ethnic majority Singapore and 
Malay-ethnic majority Kuala Lumpur grew until 
Singapore was expelled from the Federation in 
1965. 
Coalitions pre-dated the country’s inception as a 
mainstay of Malaysian politics. For the past four 
decades, the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional 
(BN) has held a majority of the parliament seats, 
while Pakatan Rakyat (PR) has become an increas-
ingly viable opposition. Beginning in the 1980s, 
Malaysia’s two major Malay-Muslim political par-
ties, United Malay’s National Organisation 
(UMNO) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) 
have found that their successes are increasingly 
synonymous with Muslim interests. An internal 
demographic shift saw the population of Malay 
ethnics, a fairly homogeneous voting bloc, grow 
by more than 7% of the proportion of the coun-
try’s total population over two decades. (Malays 
constituted 53% of the population in 1980, 58.6% 
in 1990, and 60.4% in 2000.)  Defence of Muslim 2
actors became a cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign 
policy. Outside of politics, the eminence of Islam 
penetrated all levels of Malaysian society, includ-
ing symbols of Islam which became widely visible 
across Malaysia. Fundamentalist leanings abated 
under Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad 
who preached Islam’s compatibility with moderni-
ty.  
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Ma-
hathir’s successor, initiated the Islam Haradi 
project, the first in a series of top-down, nation-
building initiatives. This project did not serve 
UMNO well and the BN lost their two-thirds ma-
 Peter G. Riddell, “Islamization, Civil Society and Religious Minorities in Malaysia.” Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic 2
Challenges for the 21st Century. Singapore. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
Malaysia By Numbers
Official Name: Federation of Malaysia (1963–present)
Capital: Kuala Lumpur; Putrajaya (seat of federal government)
Area: 328, 657 sq km
Population: 30 million (country); 1.6 million (Kuala Lumpur)
Ethnic Groups: Malay (50%), Chinese (23%), Indigenous (12%), Indian (7%), 
Other (1%), Non-citizens (8%)
Religion: Islam (61%), Buddhism (20%), Christianity (9%), Hinduism (6%), 
Other or None (3%)
Language: Bahasa Malaysia (official), English, Chinese (Cantonese, 
Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Foochow), Tamil, 
Telugu, Malayalam, Panjabi, Thai, and in East Malaysia 
there are several indigenous languages; most widely 
spoken are Iban and Kadazan)
 
Currency: Ringgit (MYR)
GDP (PPP): US$312 billion [2013 est.]
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$17,500 [2013 est.]
GDP Real Growth Rate: 4.7% [2013 est.]
Labour Force: Agriculture (11.1%), Industry (36%), Services (53.5%)
Literacy: 93.1% (15 years and older); 95.4% (male), 90.7% (female)
No. of Mobile Telephones: 41.32 million [2012 est.]
No. of Internet Users: 15.35 million [2009 est.]
Life Expectancy: 74.52 years 
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/)
jority in the 2008 election for the first time since 
1969. The unfavourable results for the incumbent 
party had a galvanising effect on society. For the 
first time, the political opposition seemed viable, 
and it was no longer clear whether Barisan Na-
sional (BN)  or UMNO would remain in power. 
B. Current Challenges 
Though Malaysia has seen rapid industrialisation 
and poverty alleviation since it gained indepen-
dence, it still faces a number of political and social 
issues. The ISL research team has identified the 
following as key challenges and opportunities:  
❖UNMO as a lesser majority. The current Prime 
Minister Najib Razak began his term by single-
handedly spearheading the One Malaysia initia-
tive, which championed the idea of universal 
citizenship and nation-building. The initiative 
saw a backlash from Malay-Muslim non-gov-
ernmental organisations and lobby groups, who 
did not believe Najib fully supported their inter-
ests. He has also failed to win over the 
Malaysian-Chinese population by leaving issues 
concerning Islam’s place in the law unresolved. 
(This refers in particular to a case in which the 
right of non-Muslims to use the Arabic word 
Allah to refer to God was revoked.) Since the 
2013 election, where UMNO lost their two-
thirds majority in the parliament, One Malaysia 
has quietened down, only to be succeeded by a 
new campaign, Malaysia: Endless Possibilities, 
though this was largely seen as a public rela-
tions exercise. The lack of popularity of these 
nation-building projects shows that divisions 
along ethnic lines in Malaysia still run deep. 
More recently, PM Najib Razak hit the biggest 
crisis of his six-year tenure with allegations that 
hundreds of millions of dollars went missing in 
deals involving state-owned investment compa-
ny 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), 
which he launched in 2009. While the fate of the 
funds remains unclear, political analysts warn 
that damage from the episode could spell fu-
ture electoral disaster for the ruling coalition 
that has governed for 57 years. It already is 
steadily losing ground among a new generation 
of voters seeking greater political freedom and 
an end to corruption. In the meantime, the 
Malaysian ringgit has slid to 17-year lows, with 
investors rattled by the international outlook 
and the 1MDB funding fiasco.  
❖ An inverse relationship between economic de-
velopment and income inequality. Income in-
equality is a pressing issue in Malaysia. The richest 
10% of the country’s population earns more than 
34% of the country’s income while the poorest 
10% earns only 2%. Though it is an industrialised 
economy with the second highest per capita in-
come in Southeast Asia, the World Bank estimat-
ed an overall poverty rate of 1.7% in 2012.  The 3
numerous soup kitchens and shelters are markers 
of urban poverty in Kuala Lumpur. Under the New 
Economic Model of 2010 (NEM) and Vision 2020, 
Prime Minister Najib has announced his goal for 
Malaysia to pass the threshold of a high-income 
economy by 2020.  To pursue this goal he aims to 4
expand high technology industries and Islamic 
finance through foreign investment. These indus-
tries will not create positions for unskilled workers 
as the NEM does not include provisions for the 
redistribution of wealth. In addition, Malaysia’s 
status as an upper-middle income economy  has 5
caused a decline in the number of foreign aid 
organisations setting up in the country. If the 2020 
target is met, it is likely that the presence of in-
ternational NGOs in Malaysia, and thus services 
for the country’s needy populations, will decrease 
considerably. 
❖ Difficulties with the inclusion of indigenous 
groups. Widespread institutional discrimination 
against the indigenous groups in Malaysia per-
sists. The Orang Asli (“original people” in Malay) 
refers to the indigenous group on the Malaysian 
Peninsula, whose estimated population was 
178,000 in 2010. After their help in defeating the 
communist insurgents during the 1948 “Emer-
 “Malaysia,” accessed January 5, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia.3
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies an economy as “high-income” as having a minimum GDP per capita of $12,476.4
 The IMF classifies an economy as “upper-middle income” as having a GDP per capita of between $4,036 to $12,475; the current estimate 5
of Malaysia’s GDP per capita is $10,500.
gency,” the Aboriginal Peoples Act of 1954 was 
enacted to offer protections for their land. How-
ever, it also gave the Director-General of the De-
partment of Orang Asli affairs the power to evict 
and compensate them for their land. The Centre 
for Orang Asli Concerns estimates that only 12% 
of Orang Asli villages are recognised as protected 
and inadequate compensation is offered when 
their land is seized. In addition, their ancestral 
lands are often in rural areas where infrastructure 
is costly to develop. They are further excluded 
from many educational and economic opportuni-
ties as schools and other government services are 
often very far away from their villages. Govern-
ment figures from 2007 indicate that 7,000 in-
digenous children were not attending school.   6
In Sarawak, the Iban and other indigenous groups 
make up over 40% of the population of 2.3 mil-
lion, and the Kadazan-Dusan and other indige-
nous groups in Sabah make up 60% of the popu-
lation of 3 million. These groups have much high-
er levels of poverty than their Malay, Chinese, and 
Indian counterparts. In Eastern Malaysia, the 
Sabah Land Ordinance 1930 and the Sarawak 
Land Code, laws created to protect the native 
lands of indigenous people, have been increas-
ingly disregarded to allow for mass deforestation. 
In both states, Malay is the official language. This 
excludes many indigenous people from govern-
ment positions, which require Malay. 
❖ A varied approach to the influx of Muslim 
refugees. The United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees estimates that there are approxi-
mately 97,000 refugees residing in Malaysia, 
40,000 of which are stateless. The Malaysian gov-
ernment classifies these people as “irregular mi-
grants” and has no process in place to address 
their needs. Thus, they are not granted access to 
government aid and services. They often settle in 
urban areas which provide more opportunities for 
employment, both formal and informal. In Kuala 
Lumpur, refugees squat in Chow Kit, an area of 
the city which has become the epicentre of drug 
use, prostitution, and other illegal activities in the 
city.  
The present cohort of refugees mostly consists of 
Muslim minorities from nearby countries who see 
Malaysia as a safe place to practise their faith. 
Large numbers of Rohingya Muslims from the 
Rakhine state of northern Myanmar have entered 
the Malaysian Peninsula through Thailand, fleeing 
sectarian violence. Similarly, Muslims from the 
unstable Southern Philippines and the Indonesian 
territory of Borneo, have fled to the Eastern 
Malaysian state of Sabah. However, in this case, 
the UMNO-controlled government has enfran-
chised huge portions of these groups in order to 
maintain the Muslim-majority in the state. 
❖ The rise of social enterprise with government 
participation. Businesses with a positive social 
impact are not new, but the term “social enter-
prise” has received growing publicity in Malaysia 
due to government funding schemes and declin-
ing domestic and foreign support for NGOs. Not 
unique to Malaysia, young people view NGOs as 
obsolete, unsustainable models and prefer to 
start social enterprises, which are associated with 
innovation. In 2013, the fifth Global Social Busi-
ness Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur. As this 
was the first time the summit was held outside of 
Europe, it signifies the importance and scale of 
social entrepreneurship in Malaysia’s capital. At 
the summit, Prime Minister Najib announced a 
RM20 million in social business funds to be ad-
ministered by the Malaysian Global Innovation 
and Creative Centre (MaGIC). Although no infor-
mation about the fund has been released publicly 
since, the announcement caused excitement and 
encouraged people to join the social business 
sphere with the anticipation that the money would 
be available. In addition to MaGIC, there are 
many private organisations that provide support, 
such as networking opportunities, incubation, and 
workspaces, to social entrepreneurs. 
As previously discussed, foreign aid and the ap-
petite for social work in Malaysia has decreased 
since the country achieved upper-middle income 
status. As a result, existing NGOs face a constant 
struggle to meet funding needs and increasingly 
desire a more sustainable model, which social 
enterprise provides, while retaining the objective 
of social impact. Conversely, the Malaysian gov-
 Gooch, Liz. “Indigenous Malaysians Miss School, Agency Finds.” New York Times (New York, NY), Sept. 9, 2012. 6
ernment often annexes very successful NGOs, 
especially those which it sees as in direct competi-
tion with its own social services; the social enter-
prise model is one way to ensure independence.  
Some challenges to social enterprise still exist. 
First, older populations distrust the social enter-
prise model because they do not believe in profit-
ing from disadvantaged communities. Second, no 
tax advantages exist for social enterprises as op-
posed to other for-profit companies. Social enter-
prises must legally register themselves as for-prof-
it companies or societies, a classification which 
encompasses all non-profit organisations.  
❖ Economic and security issues in the South Chi-
na Sea. Several Southeast Asian nations have 
overlapping claims to areas in the South China 
Sea, both with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and amongst themselves. Malaysia has had 
mixed results when negotiating terms with the 
countries with which it disputes territory. Malaysia 
and Vietnam submitted a joint memorandum to 
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) which designat-
ed their respective rights to the continental shelf 
including the Spratly Islands and surrounding 
area. In 2009, Malaysia ceded ownership of a con-
tested maritime territory to Brunei in exchange for 
permission to explore the territory for resources. 
Though it does not specifically address contested 
maritime territory, Malaysian state-owned 
Petronas agreed to supply natural gas to the 
PRC’s Shanghai LNH company beginning in 2006, 
which increases the incentive and stakes for state 
cooperation. In total, bilateral trade with the PRC 
has surpassed $50 billion in recent years, making 
Malaysia the PRC’s largest trading partner in 
Southeast Asia. Relations with other states have 
been less amicable. Indonesia and Malaysia have 
engaged in short naval disputes over Ambalat, 
the sea area to the south east of Sabah. The 
Philippines still officially regards Sabah as disput-
ed territory, even though the only recent action 
was taken by a non-state actor — an armed Filipino 
Muslim group who referred to themselves as the 
“Sultans of Sulu” — who invaded and attempted to 
occupy the island before they were stopped by 
Malaysian security forces in March 2013. 
 
❖ Recent appointments to regional and global 
leadership roles.  In 2015, Malaysia will chair the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
It is one of the five founding members of ASEAN – 
now comprised of ten members – along with In-
donesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Malaysia’s foreign policy has all but mirrored that 
of ASEAN since its inception. Malaysia will also 
occupy a non-permanent seat on the United Na-
tions Security Council during 2015. This role 
could become increasingly important as the UN 
addresses global security threats such as the Is-
lamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Malaysia lob-
bied persistently for this seat and believes it is an 
opportunity for them to pursue the agenda of 
Prime Minister Najib’s Global Movement of Mod-
erates — which spells moderation in all aspects of 
policy — at a global level. These two key appoint-
ments are an opportunity for Malaysia to be a 
prominent voice of Islamic nations and should 
lead to significant conversations surrounding re-
gional and global issues. However, it may also 
bring increased exposure and scrutiny to the 
country’s own politics, and its internal and foreign 
affairs. 
C. Insights from the Malaysia Labs 
❖ Social entrepreneurs often focus more on social 
impact than on a viable business model.  
Social enterprises in Kuala Lumpur are not always 
the primary source of income for their founders. 
Either the founders continue in their full time posi-
tions in the private sector alongside their social 
enterprise or they are independently wealthy. 
Therefore, although social enterprises are meant 
to be profit-yielding, this is not the emphasis for 
these founders. Several people in the social en-
terprise sphere have reported that founders often 
refuse to accept failures. These businesses are 
their “passion projects” and often are not mea-
sured against the same standards used for tradi-
tional businesses. In fact, social enterprise 
founders often use another income stream, such 
as their personal funds or government grants, to 
keep these ventures afloat.  
 
❖ New generations are increasingly involved in 
the social sector, especially through social enter-
prise.  
For privileged individuals with influential posi-
tions in society, usually identified by Malay hon-
orific titles, contributing to society is an essential 
way of “saving face.” However, their social 
projects are often supplemented by a traditional, 
often family-owned, business and there is a trend 
among wives and children of Malaysian busi-
nessmen of forgoing their roles in the business 
altogether to start or support SIOs. This practice is 
indicative of a larger and growing trend among 
millennials, especially those educated abroad, 
who are not satisfied with corporate careers as 
were past generations. They instead strive for a 
career that serves society in addition to their own 
needs, which often centres around a sense of 
ownership. The social enterprise is a more appeal-
ing model to serve this dual purpose than NGOs 
which offer notoriously low compensation. 
❖ NGOs offer critical social services when the 
government does not provide. 
Although Malaysia is an upper-middle income 
economy, poverty in Kuala Lumpur is still quite 
visible and there are an estimated 1500 homeless 
persons in the city. Government agencies and 
policies are not always comprehensive enough to 
provide aid to all of those in need.  Indigenous 
peoples and refugees are not always included in 
government services. Therefore, many of the city’s 
NGOs provide basic social services such as 
healthcare, food handouts, foster care for chil-
dren, documentation and legal services for them. 
❖ Patronage is essential to the success of social 
impact organisations (SIOs).  
Many Malaysian NGOs have a Dato or Datin who 
was the public face of the organisation, but gen-
erally do not participate in its daily operations. 
The existence of such patrons is necessary for 
obtaining sustained government support in the 
form of grants or authorisation for projects which 
may otherwise be stalled indefinitely due to bu-
reaucratic obstacles. One corporate foundation 
professional told us that NGOs are likely to fail 
without patronage, even if they have adequate 
funding and other forms of support. An influential 
figure is key for an organisation to achieve and 
sustain momentum. Having an influential figure 
attached to an organisation is helpful for fundrais-
ing as well. An active philanthropist disclosed that 
her wealthy friends rely on her for direction as to 
where to make charitable donations and are more 
likely to give to projects in which she is involved.  
❖ In the transition from NGOs to social enter-
prise, a mismatch appears between the skills of 
current social sector professionals and those 
needed for social enterprise.  
As a result of decreased international funding, 
NGOs are seeking to restructure and become 
more sustainable. This often means converting to 
become a social enterprise, a model which, as 
previously stated, has recently been highly prop-
agated by the government. However, human re-
sources issues have arisen with this transition. 
First, many social entrepreneurs complained 
about the lack of professionals with business and 
management skills available for hire. Second, full-
time staff retention is a problem as the working 
conditions and salaries offered by social enter-
prises are not able to match those of established 
enterprises. 
V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
Asia Pacific Forum on Families Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, 11 November 2014. 
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MindValley. Kuala Lumpur, 1 October 2014. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore. Kuala Lumpur, 30 September 2014. 
New Straits Times. Kuala Lumpur, 1 October 2014. 
Penang Institute. George Town, 16 March 2015. 
Penang Women’s Development Corporation. George Town, 17 March 2015. 
OrphanCARE	  Founda/on	  
Recovr Initiative. Kuala Lumpur, 11 November 2014. 
Social Enterprise Alliance. Kuala Lumpur, 2 October 2014. 
Starfish Malaysia Foundation. Kuala Lumpur, 1 October 2014. 
Tandemic. Kuala Lumpur, 11 November 2014. 
Universi/	  Sains	  Malaysia	  
Universi/	  Tunku	  Abdul	  Rahman	  (UTAR)	  
University of Malaya. Kuala Lumpur, 11 November 2014. 
Yayasan Chow Kit. Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 2014. 
  
 
Total Organisations Interviewed: 27 
SIO: 17 
 Corporate Foundation: 2 
 Incubators: 6 
 Nonprofits: 8 
 Social Enterprises: 1  
Government: 4 
Commercial: 1 
Media & Academia: 5 
ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
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5
Commercial
1
Government
4 SIO17 SIO SUB-SECTORS
Incubators
6
Social Ent.
1Corporate Phil.
2
Nonprofits
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VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Malaysia?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
from when it first began operations in Malaysia? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
your current collaborations?  
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such rela-
tionships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to 
succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Malaysian leaders need to better serve their society?  
17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable 
value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
any remarkable individuals in Malaysia whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your 
current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives? 
Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Malaysia differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? 
What does Malaysia have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities 
actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing Malaysia?  
25) How is Malaysia different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the 
next five years?  
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